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Traditional justifications for patents are all based on direct or indirect 
contribution to the creation of new products. Patents serve the social interest if 
they provide not just invention, but innovation the world would not otherwise 
have. Non-practicing entities (“NPEs”) as well as product-producing 
companies can sometimes provide such innovation, either directly, through 
working the patent or transferring technology to others who do, or indirectly, 
when others copy the patented innovation. The available evidence suggests, 
however, that patent licensing demands and lawsuits from NPEs are normally 
not cases that involve any of these activities. 
Some scholars have argued that patents can be valuable even without 
technology transfer because the ability to exclude others from the market may 
drive commercialization that would not otherwise occur. We demonstrate that 
even if various commercialization theories can sometimes justify patent 
protection, they cannot justify most NPE lawsuits or licensing demands. 
INTRODUCTION 
Of the many governmental activities we undertake in this country, few are 
as purely and explicitly utilitarian as the patent system.1 The patent system 
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exists to bring about a particular result, rather than out of a sense of an 
inventor’s moral rights or as a matter of equity.2 From the many commercial 
activities that might otherwise be open to anyone, we remove some, for a 
limited period of time, in the hope that dedicating them to the province of a 
few will redound to the benefit of us all.3 The benefit—in other words, what 
the patent system is designed to promote—is commonly referred to as 
“innovation.” 
The traditional utilitarian story supporting the patent system is that the lure 
of patent rights encourages invention that would not otherwise occur, or at 
least would occur later but for the patent.4 The invention the system is 
designed to promote is not what is known in science as “basic research,” such 
as an understanding of how nature works or what forces propel the universe. 
After all, for more than a century, the courts have reminded us that the proper 
subject matter of a patent does not include laws of nature, natural phenomena, 
or abstract ideas—no matter how valuable and essential to the progress of 
science these may be.5 Rather, the patent system is aimed at protecting 
“applied” inventions—or innovations—that are deployed in the world. Only 
when broad and basic principles are reduced to a particular practice and 
applied in a specific endeavor will they be eligible for protection.6 
The patent system’s focus is consistent with economic literature, which 
distinguishes invention—an idea—from innovation—turning an idea into a 
viable product. The patent system encourages not just invention in the abstract, 
but the creation of new products. This is the “[p]rogress” of the “useful [a]rts” 
mentioned in the Patent Clause of the Constitution.7 
 
1 For a discussion of the version of utilitarianism applied in the patent system, see ROBIN 
FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 76-78 (2012). For debate on this point, compare 
ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 102-36 (2011) (arguing for patent 
rights on moral basis), with Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA 
L. REV. 1328, 1336-38 (2015) (critiquing those moral claims). 
2 See generally Lemley, supra note 1 (arguing that justifications of intellectual property 
(“IP”) rights based on moral claims are unpersuasive). 
3 Robin Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 250, 252 
(2013). 
4 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294-310 (2003); see also John F. Duffy, The Marginal Cost 
Controversy in Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 37, 52-53 (2004); Steven Shavell & 
Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525, 
530 (2001). 
5 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014). 
6 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“[W]hile an abstract idea, law of nature, or 
mathematical formula [can]not be patented, ‘an application of a law of nature or 
mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent 
protection.’” (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981))). 
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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The focus on innovation, not simply invention, is particularly important with 
the emergence of the modern non-practicing entity (“NPE”) business model. 
Colloquially known as “patent trolls,” NPEs are those entities whose core 
activity involves licensing or litigating patents, as opposed to making 
products.8 By all accounts, the modern NPE business model has expanded 
rapidly over the last two decades, an expansion that is particularly evident in 
the context of litigation.9 Different scholars slice the numbers differently. For 
example, some exclude NPEs organized as trusts as well as individual 
inventors and others exclude “failed startups.”10 When the broader definition is 
applied, however, the data are remarkably consistent across studies, with all 
showing that NPEs now account for the majority of patent lawsuits filed in the 
United States.11 
Our goal in this Essay is to assess whether lawsuits filed by NPEs are 
efficient. By “efficient,” we do not mean “are the lawyers working as quickly 
and cheaply as they could?” Rather, our goal is to determine under what 
circumstances the enforcement of patent rights might benefit society. As we 
 
8 John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, How Often Do Non-Practicing 
Entities Win Patent Suits?, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 235, 240 (2017); Robin Feldman, 
Federalism, First Amendment and Patents: The Fraud Fallacy, 17 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. 
REV. 30, 32 (2015) (defining patent trolls and NPEs as those whose core business involves 
licensing and litigating stripped patent rights as opposed to making products with those 
patents); see also Robin Feldman, Patent Demands and Startup Companies: The View from 
the Venture Capital Community, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 236, 244-53 (2014) (describing 
nuances in use of various terms (including NPE, patent assertion entity, and patent 
monetization entity), concluding that broad definition of those whose core activity involves 
licensing and litigating patents rather than making products is best, and suggesting that 
monetizer might be better term than NPE). 
9 Allison, Lemley & Schwartz, supra note 8, at 237 (noting that NPEs “account for a 
majority of all defendants sued for patent infringement” and may “win both larger 
judgments or larger settlements than . . . operating companies”). 
10 Id. at 240. 
11 Compare Colleen Chien, Assistant Professor, Santa Clara Univ., Patent Assertion 
Entities, Presentation to the FTC/DOJ Workshop on PAEs (Dec. 10, 2012), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2187314 [https://perma.cc/863E-RU2B] 
(using data from RPX Corporation and concluding that percentage of litigation by NPEs in 
2012 had reached sixty-one percent), and Robin Feldman, Tom Ewing & Sara Jeruss, The 
AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects of Patent Monetization Entities, 17 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 
(ISSUE 2) 1, 7 (2013) (“[I]n 2012, litigation by patent monetization entities represented a 
majority of the patent litigation filed in the United States.”), with Christopher A. Cotropia, 
Jay P. Kesan & David L. Schwartz, Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN. 
L. REV. 649, 655 (2014) (using narrower definition of NPEs and finding no real increase in 
NPE litigation when comparing years 2010 and 2012, but also noting that “when we 
repackage all [NPEs] into a single category, they are responsible for a majority of [patent 
lawsuits] in 2012”). See also Matthew Sag, IP Litigation in the U.S. District Courts: 1994-
2014, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1065, 1081 (2016) (finding that patent litigation volume doubled 
from 2010 to 2012). 
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demonstrate, while there are various ways patent enforcement might serve 
utilitarian ends, those approaches all involve some sort of technology transfer 
from the inventor to implementers or the public at large. Without that 
technology transfer, patent enforcement represents a pure cost to society and a 
tax on innovation. Unfortunately, a large fraction of the patent lawsuits filed 
today fall in the category of pure costs to society. 
I. INNOVATION-RELATED JUSTIFICATIONS FOR NPES 
Consistent with the utilitarian goals of the patent system, all of the 
arguments suggesting NPEs benefit society rest on their contribution, either 
directly or indirectly, to the creation of products somewhere in the system. 
NPEs, unlike practicing entities, do not deploy the technology in the world 
themselves, but that doesn’t answer the question of whether they contribute to 
innovation and the creation of new products. To promote innovation they must 
not only invent, but that invention must lead to the creation of products by 
someone, somewhere in the system, at some point. NPEs may be acting as 
middlemen, transferring technology to those who would implement it, or they 
could be collecting revenue from those who copied their invention and 
implemented it. Neither possibility, however, appears broadly supported by the 
available evidence. 
There is substantial literature that calls into question whether the patent 
system in general encourages innovation that would not otherwise happen. The 
facts that most significant innovations are simultaneously created by two or 
more people working independently12 and that in most industries virtually all 
patent enforcement is done against independent inventors13 cast significant 
doubt on the claim that the innovations would not have happened but for the 
lure of a patent. The issue is, however, complicated by the very different 
characteristics of different industries. There may be industries in which 
invention is so complex and uncertain that it would not be undertaken without 
patent protection.14 But there also appear to be industries—perhaps most of 
them—in which the patent system does not seem to be driving new invention, 
and may even be retarding it.15 That might lead one to question the patent 
 
12 Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 711 (2012). 
13 Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 
1421, 1424 (2009). 
14 DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN 
SOLVE IT 80-81 (2009) (arguing that in pharmaceutical industry, investment in research 
would likely drop substantially without effective patent protection due to high costs of 
innovation and relative ease of copying inventions). 
15 JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, 
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 21-24 (2008) (arguing that patent system 
particularly fails with respect to software patents). 
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system as a whole16 or at least the traditional innovation-based justification for 
it. 
In addition to doubts about how well patents in general actually drive 
innovations that would not otherwise have occurred, the evidence casts 
significant doubt on the efficacy of the patent disclosure as a way of 
disseminating ideas and leading to the creation of products. While writing 
down and publishing a description of the invention has long been the quid pro 
quo for a patent, in the modern world there is good reason to think that 
engineers in many fields rarely read patents in order to learn about a 
technology.17 There are many reasons for this. Lawyers at many companies 
discourage their engineers from reading patents for fear of increasing legal 
liability.18 The quality of the disclosure in the patent may be poor, particularly 
in the information technology (“IT”) industries.19 There are simply too many 
patents in many fields to possibly keep up with,20 and six-hundred thousand 
more applications are filed every year.21 And in a fast-moving industry like IT, 
 
16 See MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 11 
(2008) (arguing that “intellectual property is an unnecessary evil”). 
17 Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21-22 (“Companies 
and lawyers tell engineers not to read patents in starting their research, lest their knowledge 
of the patent disadvantage the company by making it a willful infringer.”); Lemley, supra 
note 12, at 711 (“[D]isclosure theory, which justifies the grant of patents on the assumption 
that scientists read and learn from them, fails to grapple with the way learning occurs in the 
real world.”); Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 118 
HARV. L. REV. 2007, 2025-26 (2005) (“[E]ngineers often find it difficult to extract useful 
information from the written description [in a patent application], which . . . weakens the 
disclosure value of patents.”). By contrast, in some fields patents may provide more useful 
guidance to engineers. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 
25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 547 (2012) (finding that in field of nanotechnology, patents 
contain “useful, nonduplicative technical information”); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Who 
Reads Patents?, 35 NATURE BIOTECH. 421, 422 (2017). 
18 Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law’s Willfulness Game, 18 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1100-01 (2003) (“Once a company becomes aware of a patent, 
it has an obligation to obtain a written opinion of counsel or risk later being held a willful 
infringer. . . . [L]awyers regularly advise their clients not to read patents if there is any way 
to avoid it.”); Lemley, supra note 17, at 21-22. 
19 BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 14, at 158 (citing software patents as likely to “be 
supported by very little in the way of detailed disclosure” due to the Federal Circuit’s 
relaxed enablement requirement); ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 90-123 
(2012) (describing how the last fifty years of cases related to computer technology have led 
to approval of patents containing limited useful information). 
20 Lemley, supra note 17, at 19 n.1 (noting that more than one-third of all patents issued 
as of 2008 had been issued in the preceding twenty years). 
21 David Rogers, United States Patent Application Filings Exceed 600,000 for the 
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a delay of several years between invention and disclosure may make the 
technology described obsolete by the time anyone could read the patent.22 
Further, economic literature suggests that effective technology transfer—in 
other words, transfer that can lead to commercialization—requires more than 
just reading a patent.23 Such transfer generally must include not only the 
information publicly available in the patent, but also the transfer of know-how, 
complementary assets, and other peripheral disclosures.24 Thus, if patents 
actually drive innovation by third parties we would expect to see not simply 
patenting but business transactions that involve the transfer of other types of 
information assets.25 
Alternatively, NPEs could drive innovation if they served as efficient 
middlemen, connecting those who invent but whose inventions have not been 
deployed with those who can produce something from that invention. Several 
people have argued that NPEs serve this role.26 Here, too, an innovation benefit 
requires technology transfer. The social benefit of the middleman story 
depends on the middleman providing something of value to the implementer.27 
 
22 Robin Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Do Patent Licensing Demands Mean Innovation?, 
101 IOWA L. REV. 137, 159-60 (2015). 
23 Id. at 155 n.40. 
24 JAMES BESSEN, LEARNING BY DOING: THE REAL CONNECTION BETWEEN INNOVATION, 
WAGES, AND WEALTH 3 (2015); Jason Rantanen, Peripheral Disclosure, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 
1, 7 (2012) (defining “peripheral disclosure” as disclosure of information that would not 
occur but for incentives provided by patent system); David J. Teece, Profiting from 
Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and 
Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285, 293 (1986) (noting that knowledge and competencies 
necessary to produce even “modestly complex technologies” are quite demanding and 
difficult for one company to maintain on its own). 
25 Acquisition is one means of technology transfer. See generally John F. Coyle & Greg 
D. Polsky, Acqui-Hiring, 63 DUKE L.J. 281 (2013). 
26 E.g., Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 TEX. L. REV. 253, 286-87 (2009); 
B. Zorina Khan, Trolls and Other Patent Inventions: Economic History and the Patent 
Controversy in the Twenty-First Century, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 825, 832-33 (2014); 
David F. Spulber, Intellectual Property and the Theory of the Firm, in PERSPECTIVES ON 
COMMERCIALIZING INNOVATION 9, 31 (F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes eds., 2012). 
27 Thus, we do not share what some have characterized as skepticism about IP licensing 
generally. See generally Jonathan M. Barnett, Why Is Everyone Afraid of IP Licensing?, 
30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123 (2017). To be honest, we’re not sure that most of the people 
Barnett points to do either. Barnett correctly articulates ways that IP licensing can improve 
firm performance. But all those ways involve ex ante technology transfer. See, e.g., Oskar 
Liivak, Private Law and the Future of Patents, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 33, 48-52 (2016) 
(encouraging focus on ex ante technology transfer as basis for patent law). The skepticism 
about IP licensing is more properly understood in our view as skepticism about licensing IP 
rights without any technology transfer. 
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II. DOES PATENT ENFORCEMENT INVOLVE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER? 
In short, then, the traditional justifications for NPEs contributing to social 
welfare all involve some form of technology transfer or learning dissemination 
by which the NPE or the patent it holds teaches the implementer a technology 
it would not otherwise possess. Practicing entities can benefit social welfare 
without technology transfer by making and selling the invention directly; NPEs 
cannot. 
The early evidence testing the positive impact of NPEs on 
commercialization goals is not encouraging. That evidence is largely 
observational in nature, flowing from small sample studies, with all of the 
attendant limitations. Nevertheless, the data provide a useful window into the 
NPE business model and suggest approaches for generalizable analyses. 
We provide survey evidence of the direct measure of new product creation 
as a result of patent assertions by NPEs. We also tested commercialization 
effects by measuring other markers of potential innovation, such as technology 
transfer beyond the patent. Including such markers creates a more dynamic 
picture of the potential for future commercialization, even if that 
commercialization has yet to occur. 
We know that actual technology transfer happens within the patent system 
in the ex ante context.28 Both practicing entities and some NPEs engage in ex 
ante technology transfer. In particular, universities and inventors create 
alliances with companies that can more easily develop and commercialize their 
inventions through joint ventures and other types of technology and research 
sharing agreements.29 These agreements frequently occur before a patent issues 
or even before any of the parties file for a patent.30 Notably, these agreements 
involve technology transfer.31 Universities and other inventors in these deals 
provide new technology to those in a position to implement it.32 And that 
technology often includes trade secrets and know-how beyond the to-be-
patented technology itself.33 Further, technology transfer can occur informally, 
by the communication of information at scientific conferences, through journal 
 
28 ASHISH ARORA, ANDREA FOSFURI & ALFONSO GAMBARDELLA, MARKETS FOR 
TECHNOLOGY: THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION AND CORPORATE STRATEGY 116-17 (2001). 
See generally Colleen V. Chien, The Market for Software Innovation Through the Lens of 
Patent Licenses and Sales, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript on file 
with authors) (documenting technology transfer in many software licenses, but also large 
number of software patent licenses without technology transfer). 




33 Id. at 155 n.40. 
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articles, and even through commitments to open sharing of patented 
technologies.34 
Patent litigation and licensing demands for existing patents, by contrast, 
tend to occur after the defendant has already developed and implemented the 
technology. This is particularly true of NPE patent assertions and licensing 
demands, which some evidence suggests tend to happen in the last few years of 
a patent’s life, although the picture is complicated.35 NPE licensing demands 
and litigation against companies that are producing products do not seem to 
involve technology transfer or other indicia of new innovation. Indeed, 
evidence suggests NPEs may buy patents with vaguely-worded claims that are 
optimized for litigation but lacking in technical merit36 and that they may delay 
licensing of patents in order to increase revenue by targeting successful 
implementers after the fact.37 
While some have argued that NPEs serve as efficient middlemen through 
this activity—transferring inventions from creators to commercializers—we 
found no such evidence in our 2015 study.38 We surveyed 191 in-house 
licensing attorneys at companies that produce products on the theory that these 
parties have direct knowledge of whether the company implemented new 
technology and because in-house counsel tend to negotiate licenses both as 
patent holders and as potential licensees.39 The survey examined the effects of 
licenses that a company took after receiving a patent demand, which was 
defined to include calls or letters suggesting areas of mutual interest or joint 
ventures, offering to license patents, threatening litigation, giving notice of 
intent to file an infringement lawsuit, or actually filing an infringement 
lawsuit.40 Respondents were asked whether those licenses led to any markers 
 
34 See generally Colleen V. Chien, Opening the Patent System: Diffusionary Levers in 
Patent Law, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 793 (2016). 
35 Feldman, Ewing & Jeruss, supra note 11, at 8-9 (analyzing patent litigation data and 
finding that newer patents were asserted more frequently and that NPEs were more willing 
to assert patents of any age); Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: 
Could a Patent Term Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1309, 1312 (2013) (“NPEs . . . assert[] their patents relatively late in the patent term 
and frequently continue to litigate their patents to expiration.”). 
36 Josh Feng & Xavier Jaravel, Who Feeds the Trolls? Patent Trolls and the Patent 
Examination Process (2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=2838017 [https://perma.cc/6656-SS7D]. 
37 Erik Hovenkamp, How Reasonable Royalties Suppress Patent Licensing (2017) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2607678 
[https://perma.cc/ABR2-3RVG]. For thoughts on how to break the “vicious cycle of 
excessive, socially harmful remedies,” see William F. Lee & A. Douglas Melamed, 
Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Patent Damages, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 385, 385 (2016). 
38 See generally Feldman & Lemley, supra note 22. 
39 Id. at 144-49 (describing methodology of 2015 study). 
40 Id. at 149-55. 
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of innovation.41 Direct markers of innovation included the addition of new 
products or features.42 Indirect markers of innovation included whether the 
patent holder transferred know-how, other technical knowledge, or personnel 
(including through a consulting agreement) along with the patent, and whether 
any joint ventures were created.43 Again, the survey considered only licenses 
taken in response to unsolicited licensing requests.44 It did not look at the 
practice, particularly among university inventors, of entering into technology 
transfer agreements before embarking on the development of a new 
technology.45 
The responses suggest that licensing requests from NPEs rarely lead to 
direct or indirect markers of innovation. Ninety-two percent of respondents 
reported that when they licensed technology from NPEs, they added new 
products or features as a result of that licensing zero to ten percent of the 
time.46 The results were even stronger when respondents were asked about 
indirect markers of innovation, with respondents unanimously reporting that 
they rarely received technical knowledge, transfer of personnel, or joint 
ventures along with a patent license.47 Thus, the results suggest that NPEs do 
not appear to be playing the role of efficient middlemen. While it is certainly 
possible that a middleman role could be reflected in markers other than the 
ones we examined, we did not find such evidence in our preliminary work. 
Interestingly, the evidence was also dismal when ex post licensing requests 
came from those other than traditional NPEs.48 When product producing 
entities and universities made unsolicited approaches and those approaches 
resulted in a licensing agreement, the agreements were unlikely to lead to 
direct or indirect markers of innovation.49 Three-quarters of respondents 
reported new products or features from zero to ten percent of the time, ninety-
four percent reported transfers of personnel (including through consulting 
agreements) zero to ten percent of the time, and ninety-one percent reported 
joint ventures from zero to ten percent of the time.50 These observational 
results suggest that ex post patent licensing demands don’t appear to lead to 
 
41 Id. at 155-66. 
42 Id. at 160 fig.9, 161 figs.10 & 11. 
43 Id. at 162 figs.12 & 13, 163 figs.14 & 15, 164 figs.16 & 17, 165 figs.18 & 19, 166 
fig.20. 
44 Id. at 156. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. Zero to ten percent was the lowest category offered. We suspect, though we cannot 
prove, that for almost all respondents the number was in fact zero. 
47 Id. at 157. 
48 Id. at 160. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 160, 163-64. 
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technology transfer or other markers of innovation, no matter what type of 
party initiates the unsolicited approach.51 
A middleman who is not making a product and not actually providing the 
licensee with new technology is operating at most as a tax collector, taking 
money from innovative companies, perhaps for the benefit of inventors who 
could not otherwise do battle against large companies who have implemented 
their ideas.52 And perhaps specialists are better at collecting money than some 
types of inventors, particularly independent inventors.53 But transactions are 
not desirable for their own sake.54 It is socially desirable to impose such a tax 
on innovators only if the world gains something from it. That might be true if, 
for instance, the implementer had actually copied the idea from the patentee. If 
we think copying could reduce incentives to invent, we might reasonably 
prefer to force copiers into licensing arrangements instead, compensating the 
inventor whose work is copied. 
The available evidence suggests it is unlikely that most patent enforcement 
targets such copying. For example, Cotropia and Lemley demonstrate that 
most patent lawsuits are filed against those who have developed a product 
independently, rather than those who have taken the idea from a patent 
holder.55 And while some have speculated that defendants may copy indirectly, 
learning about the invention from the patentee’s product or from scientific 
discussions of the idea in conferences or academic journal articles without ever 
reading the patent itself,56 that is far more likely when the patentee actually 
makes a product than when it produces nothing other than the patent. Nor are 
individual inventors and for-profit firms likely to disseminate their ideas in 
other ways, such as by publishing academic papers later read by others who 
copy them. Universities, by contrast, are more likely to produce this sort of 
technology transfer. Further, there is evidence that patents asserted by NPEs, 
tend to be asserted at the end of their lives, while practicing entities assert 
patents early, casting further doubt on the copying story.57 And there is very 
 
51 This was a pilot survey. We are currently at work on a much larger survey of 
responses to patent licensing demands. 
52 Feldman & Lemley, supra note 22, at 142. 
53 Stephen H. Haber & Seth H. Werfel, Patent Trolls as Financial Intermediaries? 
Experimental Evidence 1 (Sept. 21, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
54 Michael J. Burstein, Patent Markets: A Framework for Evaluation, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
507, 512-14 (2015) (noting that efficient markets that match buyers and sellers of a 
particular asset are not usually thought to be ends in themselves; instead they are 
instrumentally useful when they serve other social goals, such as allocating useful goods and 
services, or mitigating risk). 
55 Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 13, at 1424. 
56 Robert P. Merges, A Few Kind Words for Absolute Infringement Liability in Patent 
Law, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 29 (2016); Rantanen, supra note 24, at 7. 
57 Love, supra note 35, at 1312 (“Product-producing companies predominantly enforce 
their patents soon after they issue. . . . NPEs . . . assert[] their patents relatively late in the 
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little evidence that patentees have used a remedy created in 1999 to protect 
against copying of published patent applications.58  
Nor does the tax collection via patent licensing demands seem a particularly 
good way to fund future research by inventors. Although it is true that patent 
litigation can generate revenue that inventors might put back into research on 
new inventions, it is a singularly inefficient way of generating that revenue.59 
Bessen, Ford and Meurer find that only a small fraction of damages awarded to 
NPEs actually gets returned to inventors.60 Most of it is lost to legal fees and to 
the intermediaries who make money asserting the patents.61 Those inventors 
may or may not invest what return they do receive in further R&D, and that 
further R&D may or may not generate new inventions.62 But because the 
overwhelming majority of defendants in NPE suits are themselves independent 
inventors, not copiers, the system is taxing one inventor to pay another, and 
losing most of the money in the process. It would seem far more efficient to 
fund inventor research directly through general tax revenue.63 And indeed, we 
do fund the class of NPEs most likely to engage in tech transfer—
universities—in ways that mostly have nothing to do with patent litigation. 
 
patent term and frequently continue to litigate their patents to expiration.”). We (and Love) 
acknowledge that the interpretation of his data is complicated by the change in the number 
of NPE suits during the time of his study. Feldman, Ewing & Jeruss, supra note 11, at 74 
(“Thus, some of the increase in litigation activity by monetizers that Love observed during 
the final nine years of the patent term may relate to the general increase in patent litigation 
attributable to NPEs that has occurred during those years, a possibility that Love identifies 
in the article.”). 
58 35 U.S.C. § 154(d) (2012) (providing provisional rights to reasonable royalty from 
copier of published patent application). 
59 James Bessen, Jennifer Ford & Michael J. Meurer, The Private and Social Costs of 
Patent Trolls, REG., Winter 2011-12, at 26, 32-33; David Olson, On NPEs, Holdups, and 
Underlying Faults in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 140, 143 (2014) 
(describing payments to independent inventors in absence of commercialization as “wasteful 
for society”). 
60 Bessen et al., supra note 59, at 32-33 (arguing that inventors receive possibly less than 
two percent of awards NPEs receive after their pursuit of infringement suits). 
61 Fiona M. Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Strategic Patent Acquisitions, 79 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 463, 481-83 (2014) (“[A] relatively small share of the costs imposed by [NPEs] on 
targets is returned to the original patentees. In other words, the transfer of funds from 
allegedly infringing downstream firms to patentees is done using a very ‘leaky bucket.’”). 
62 Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, Patents Rights and Innovation by Small and 
Large Firms 2-5 (Nov. 20, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
63 See Camilla A. Hrdy, Commercialization Awards, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 13, 52-64 
(describing federal and state funded commercialization awards and their efficacy). See 
generally Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 
92 TEX. L. REV. 303 (2013) (arguing that innovation can be encouraged by incentives other 
than patent system, including R&D-related tax incentives). 
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Some have suggested a different theory of tax collection—that NPE patent 
suits provide an alternative way for venture capitalists to recover some of their 
investment in a failed invention. We are skeptical that venture capitalists are 
motivated by the prospect of this sort of consolation prize. They tell us that 
they aren’t. In survey responses they indicate that it is the prospect of a big 
win, not the possibility of recovering some money from a failed investment, 
that motivates them.64 But even if there were some marginal incentive related 
to additional investment from NPE taxation, that has to be weighed against the 
costs imposed on successful, product-implementing businesses, as well as on 
startups themselves.65 In particular, venture capitalists unanimously agree that 
if a startup company has a patent assertion against it, that would be a 
significant deterrent for any funding request.66 Finally, it is worth noting that a 
majority of defendants targeted in NPE suits are small companies such as 
venture-funded startups, not large companies.67 Thus, at best, many of these 
NPE suits would be taxing some venture-backed startups for the benefit of 
subsidizing others. That seems a dubious policy idea. 
III. IS OWNERSHIP A GOOD IN AND OF ITSELF? 
Responding to some of the concerns with traditional justifications for patent 
protection and licensing, a number of scholars have articulated what we call 
“commercialization-plus” justifications for patent protection. These 
justifications differ from the traditional innovation-based justifications because 
they focus on the alleged need for early or additional protections to encourage 
post-invention investment in commercialization.68 The most famous of these, 
 
64 Robin Feldman, Patent Demands & Startup Companies: The View from the Venture 
Capital Community, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 236, 243, 276-81 (2014) (reporting results of 
survey in which sixty-four percent of venture capitalists responded that when deciding 
whether to invest in startup, they did not consider the potential for selling patents to NPEs if 
the company they invested in failed). Indeed, venture capitalists report that they view the 
technology itself as less important than the management team. Paul Gompers et al., How Do 
Venture Capitalists Make Decisions? 3 (NBER Working Paper No. 22587, Sept. 2016), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w22587 [https://perma.cc/HM4K-EGVS]. 
65 Bessen, Ford & Meurer, supra note 59, at 33 (arguing that even if NPE litigation has 
small positive effect on inventors, it may still decrease overall innovation in society by 
imposing losses on defendant firms, discouraging innovation in other firms for fear of 
inadvertent infringement, and affecting research agendas of small companies toward areas 
where patents could be asserted against larger companies). 
66 Feldman, supra note 64, at 280. 
67 Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 461, 464 (2014). 
68 Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1065, 1073 (2007) (noting that patent underdevelopment occurs when patentee 
decides not to commercialize product because patent term is not long enough); Michael 
Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 337, 340 (2008) (arguing that just as patents encourage risky but ultimately 
beneficial technological experimentation, some additional form of intellectual property 
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known as “prospect theory,” recommends granting strong patents early in the 
life cycle of an idea so that a single party can control development of the idea 
much the same way that a mineral prospector manages a mineral claim site.69 
Other scholars have suggested that we should grant patents to old technologies 
in areas like pharmaceuticals in order to encourage the patent owner to engage 
in clinical trials and bring the product to market.70 Still others have suggested 
granting normal patents at the outset, and then, if no one commercializes the 
idea, granting extra rights to the person who does.71 The Bayh-Dole Act, 
passed in 1980, was premised on the worry that university inventions would 
languish unless one party was given the right to turn those inventions into 
commercial products.72 
Commercialization-plus theories are controversial. One of us has criticized 
Kitch’s prospect theory as “fundamentally anti-market” because it presumes 
that central control is superior to market allocation of existing resources,73 and 
the other has argued that patents are entirely unlike the more clearly defined 
rights in Kitch’s mineral analogy.74 Others have suggested that 
commercialization theory is poorly fitted to industries in which invention 
proceeds by stages and improvements rather than by discrete advances.75 
 
protection could result in socially beneficial increase in market experimentation and 
entrepreneurial activity); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for 
Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 703 (2001) (arguing that patent rights 
must be treated as property rights to facilitate investment in commercialization of 
inventions); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & 
ECON. 265, 275-80 (1977); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 
345 (2010) (arguing for implementing “commercialization patent” which would only be 
granted if patentee committed to commercializing invention). 
69 Kitch, supra note 68, at 275-80. 
70 Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. 
REV. 503, 507 (2009). 
71 Sichelman, supra note 68, at 345-46. 
72 COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE BAYH-DOLE ACT: A GUIDE TO THE LAW 
AND IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS 2 (1999), http://otd.harvard.edu/upload/files/The_Bayh-
Dole_Act-__A_Guide_to_the_Law_and_Implementing_Regulations.pdf [https://perma.cc/3 
P7D-P8UB] (describing the shift from non-exclusive to exclusive licensing in the wake of 
Bayh-Dole). 
73 Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 
75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1044-72 (1997) (describing prospect theory and critiquing theory in 
detail); Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 139-40 (2004) (same); Lemley, supra note 12, at 739-40 (same). 
74 FELDMAN, supra note 1, 29-34 (introducing bargain theory of patents—which suggests 
that patent provides no more than opportunity to bargain over definition of rights—by 
criticizing Kitch’s analogy to mineral rights and arguing that better analogy is to hunting 
license). 
75 Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 
90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 908 (1990). 
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Kitch’s theory may justify patent protection in certain industries. Burk and 
Lemley suggest that the theory maps best to the pharmaceutical industry, 
where government regulatory barriers significantly raise the cost of entry and 
may require exclusivity, though not necessarily exclusivity provided by the 
patent system.76 And it may justify patent protection for some kinds of NPEs, 
like universities, that are ill-suited to commercialize inventions on their own 
but wish to transfer the patent to someone who is in a better position to do so.77 
Notably, though, any form of commercialization theory is self-limiting in 
certain important respects that have not previously been discussed in the 
literature. First, if exclusivity is necessary to induce a firm to commercialize a 
technology, we should rarely, if ever, see multiple companies independently 
develop the same technology. The very concept of commercialization theory is 
that no one would invest in developing and commercializing the technology 
unless they were first confident they would have exclusive rights over that 
technology.78 There may be exceptions in which companies engage in patent 
racing, each hoping to be the first to reach an important invention and therefore 
obtain those rights.79 But the historical examples of patent races have tended to 
 
76 BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 14, at 143 (noting that development of products in 
pharmaceutical sector is characterized by long development times and high costs, due to 
constraints placed on development by significant regulatory oversight). Even there, though, 
the claim may be overstated. The pharmaceutical industry has several forms of regulatory 
exclusivity in addition to patents. See generally Robin Feldman, Regulatory Property: The 
New IP, 40 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 53 (2016) (describing history of thirteen non-patent 
exclusivities that can be obtained through Food & Drug Administration). And we see 
commercialization of biotechnology inventions like CRISPR even in the absence of patent 
protection. See generally Robin Feldman, The CRISPR Revolution: What Editing Human 
DNA Reveals About the Patent System’s DNA, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 392 (2016). 
77 See supra note 73. But see Feldman & Lemley, supra note 22, at 160-66 (presenting 
data showing ex post, as opposed to ex ante, university licensing of patents does not lead to 
much future innovation). 
78 See Kieff, supra note 68, at 703 (arguing in favor of commercialization theory by 
noting that “the power to restrict use that is conferred by a patentee’s property right and the 
strict enforcement of this right with a property rule . . . are paradoxically essential to 
avoiding underuse” of an invention). 
79 JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 394-99 (1988) (providing 
introduction to phenomenon of patent racing); Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of 
Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. & STAT. 348, 352 n.11 (1968) (describing option of granting or 
auctioning monopoly or patent rights on inventions before resources are committed to avoid 
duplicative use of resources); Partha Dasgupta & Joseph Stiglitz, Uncertainty, Industrial 
Structure, and the Speed of R&D, 11 BELL J. ECON. 1, 27 (1980) (analyzing effect of 
competition on R&D and arguing that patents are needed to get firms to engage in R&D and 
that competition may also stimulate R&D in less efficient manner); Mark F. Grady & Jay I. 
Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305, 306 (1992) (“[Patents] 
encourage hopeful inventors to squander valuable social resources in the race to win the 
patent.”); Jennifer F. Reinganum, The Timing of Innovation: Research, Development, and 
Diffusion, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 849, 853-68 (Richard 
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be races to invent, not races to commercialize.80 If commercialization theory is 
correct, even independent inventors won’t commercialize the technology 
unless and until they are confident they will have exclusive rights over that 
technology. And racing to commercialize (rather than to invent) is presumably 
something mostly engaged in by practicing entities, not NPEs. For the same 
reason, under commercialization theory we shouldn’t see companies rely on 
open source or public domain technologies.81 If we do, that is reasonable 
evidence that exclusivity is not necessary to induce commercialization in that 
industry.82 
Further, if any form of commercialization theory is correct, and certainly if 
enhanced commercialization theory is, infringement should be rare. 
Independent later inventors shouldn’t commercialize because they won’t have 
exclusive rights to the invention, which, by hypothesis, are necessary to 
develop it. Nor should we see much copying of the patentee’s invention 
because if commercialization requires market exclusivity the copier won’t 
generally be any better off than an independent inventor who doesn’t have 
exclusivity. That doesn’t mean we would never see patent litigation. But it 
does mean that if commercialization theory is correct, it should implicate 
particular circumstances such as a lower regulatory burden on second entrants 
(which is true of generic pharmaceutical companies) or some reason to think 
that simply knowing that a market exists dramatically reduces the costs of 
commercialization (which encourages others to enter despite the lack of 
exclusivity that was theoretically necessary to spur such entry).83 There may be 
such cases—Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple Inc. is arguably one84—but 
those cases would generally involve copying existing market participants, not 
independent development. 
A third implication of commercialization-plus theories is that non-practicing 
patent owners should generally not grant nonexclusive licenses. If market 
exclusivity is required for commercialization, universities should be granting 
 
Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989) (analyzing symmetric models of innovation in 
which several firms are seeking invention simultaneously). 
80 Lemley, supra note 12, at 711-12. Winners of races to invent are more likely to 
perform follow-on innovation. Neil C. Thompson & Jeffrey M. Kuhn, Does Winning a 
Patent Race Lead to More Follow-on Innovation?  (working paper 2017), https://pdfs. 
semanticscholar.org/34e3/20fb51f8c23c6ee48dd4f6b1f884df5f4cf4.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
KN6N-Y3UJ] (yes). 
81 See Clark D. Asay, Enabling Patentless Innovation, 74 MD. L. REV. 431, 434 (2015) 
(noting that open innovation has been viewed as “non-commercial” means of development). 
82 Id. (“Numerous firms have found ways to successfully commercialize open innovation, 
even making it the heart of a firm’s commercial activities in some cases.”). 
83 Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 68, at 340, 383 n.129 (noting that “second-movers” 
can have distinct advantage in that they do not have to bear cost of investing in creation or 
development of market and can copy first mover’s successes). 
84 See generally Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016). 
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exclusive licenses to practicing entities in any given market, because the 
licensee needs that exclusivity to commercialize the invention. Nonexclusive 
licenses should be rare and tightly controlled because the nonexclusive 
licensees would have to coordinate their production and pricing decisions 
under commercialization theory. And nonexclusive licenses to multiple parties 
should be nonexistent because allowing open entry into a market is inimical to 
the theory of commercialization.85 In fact, however, the evidence suggests that 
not only are most university licenses now nonexclusive,86 but the lack of 
exclusivity is an important driver of subsequent improvement for core enabling 
technologies.87 
Even if commercialization theory justifies patent protection in some 
industries, it cannot justify most modern patent litigation. Nor can it justify ex 
post licensing demands by NPEs. Outside the pharmaceutical industry, NPE 
licensing doesn’t look much like commercialization theory would predict. 
There is evidence that NPE patents are asserted later in life88—almost always 
against independent inventors.89 Ex post NPE patent licenses don’t transfer the 
technology to a party that can later make use of it.90 And NPE patent licensing 
demands essentially always seek nonexclusive licenses from multiple parties 
rather than an exclusive license from a single party. Indeed, NPEs commonly 
sue twenty or more defendants in the same industry at the same time, settling 
with each of them in exchange for a nonexclusive license.91 
The evidence also suggests that NPEs are targeting already successful 
commercializers, not facilitating new commercialization. Feldman and 
Frondorf studied fifty product companies that had initial public offerings 
 
85 Ian Ayers & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, A Market Test for Bayh-Dole Patents, 102 
CORNELL L. REV. 271, 276 (2017) (“[I]f conventional wisdom is correct that Bayh-Dole 
patents are justified only by their commercialization incentive, then a nonexclusive license 
is prima facie evidence that the invention ought not to be patented at all.”). Ayres and 
Ouellette suggest a market test for university patents, requiring them to offer a free 
nonexclusive license, and allowing them to grant an exclusive license only if no one takes 
them up on that offer. Id. at 279-80. That should smoke out any university patent cases that 
do in fact require exclusivity for commercialization. Id. at 280. 
86 See generally Jacob H. Rooksby, Innovation and Litigation: Tensions Between 
Universities and Patents and How to Fix Them, 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 312 (2013). 
87 Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 627 (2005) 
(“Ideally, universities will realize that enabling technologies are more valuable not just to 
society but even to their owners when many firms compete to exploit and improve them.”). 
88 Love, supra note 35, at 1312. 
89 Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 13, at 1423-24. 
90 Feldman & Lemley, supra note 22, at 155-60. 
91 Allison, Lemley & Schwartz, supra note 8, at 236 (noting that there is some evidence 
that NPEs assert low quality patents for nuisance-value settlements); Mark A. Lemley & A. 
Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2125-26 & 
n.41, 2128 (2013) (noting that certain models of NPEs usually want to enforce their patents 
against multiple defendants and others seek to enforce patents for licensing fees). 
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between 2007 to 2012,92 finding that forty percent of respondents received 
patent demands during the periods around the time of the IPOs, with those 
demands coming largely from NPEs.93 The effects were even more pronounced 
for IT companies, with almost sixty percent of respondents reporting patent 
demands around the time of their IPOs.94 Similarly, Cohen, Gurun and 
Kominers found that companies are more likely to be sued by an NPE 
following a large, positive, cash shock, such as a funding event or an IPO, and 
that a cash shock was a significant predictor of the number of times a company 
was sued by NPEs.95 Cohen, Gurun and Kominers also found that no other 
form of litigation has the same type of cash targeting behavior—not torts, 
contracts, securities, environmental, or labor law.96 Nothing but patent law. 
The results suggest that NPE demand behavior may be driven by the lure of 
deep pockets and the leverage opportunities afforded by an IPO period, rather 
than the meritorious representation of claims that a wronged inventor could not 
bring on its own. These studies also provide a reminder that any benefits of 
NPE activity should, at a minimum, be evaluated against the costs to 
innovation and society.97 
All forms of commercialization and product-based theories have a final, 
surprising implication for NPE suits. If the reason we need a patent is not to 
induce invention but to induce commercialization of that invention, the law 
should prefer those who actually commercialize the invention over those who 
merely invent it but do nothing further. Thus, the owners of those patents have 
failed in their purpose if they have neither commercialized the invention 
themselves nor exclusively licensed the patent to someone who does. Such an 
approach, therefore, may justify a working requirement, something that is 
generally considered anathema to patent advocates.98 Further, as between the 
NPE inventor who does not engage in technology transfer and the independent 
inventor defendant, commercialization and product-based theories should 
 
92 Robin Feldman & Evan Frondorf, Patent Demands and Initial Public Offerings, 19 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 52, 53 (2015); see also Chien, supra note 67, at 463-66; Feldman, supra 
note 64, at 237. 
93 Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 92, at 77. 
94 Id. at 84. 
95 Lauren Cohen, Umit D. Gurun & Scott Duke Kominers, Patent Trolls: Evidence from 
Targeted Firms 17-19 (NBER, Working Paper No. 20322, 2016). 
96 Id. at 20-21. 
97 See Morton & Shapiro, supra note 61, at 482-83. See generally BESSEN & MEURER, 
supra note 15. 
98 Sichelman, supra note 68, at 345 (noting that patent scholars have typically opposed 
new forms of patent rights such as commercialization patents because they impose losses 
and are costly, difficult to implement, and needlessly complex); Michael B. Abramowicz, 
The Problem of Patent Underdevelopment (GW Law Faculty Publication & Other Works, 
Working Paper No. 231, 2005), http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 
1215&context=faculty_publications [https://perma.cc/GN3U-N2SP]. 
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prefer the defendant, because it is the defendant, not the patentee, who has 
achieved the goal of the patent system. 
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS: INDEPENDENT INVENTION AND 
PRIOR USER RIGHTS 
Most other IP regimes, including copyright and trade secrets, exempt 
independent development from legal liability.99 Patent law, by contrast, 
punishes anyone who practices the claimed invention, even independent 
inventors.100 A number of scholars have suggested that patent law should adopt 
some form of independent invention or prior user rights defense.101 Others 
have worried that an independent invention defense might interfere with patent 
races or incentives to commercialize.102 
Our analysis suggests that the patent system might sensibly require that a 
patentee show either that it practices in the market or that it has engaged in 
technology transfer (direct or indirect) to those who then put the technology 
into practice.103 A patentee who cannot show either would still be able to 
enforce its patent, but only against those it could show copied the invention 
from it, directly or indirectly. This hybrid approach tracks the legal 
justifications that have been offered for patents. An inventor who develops an 
idea others copy would be able to enforce the patent against those copiers 
given that copying is a form of technology transfer (and one we view as 
socially inferior to a license agreement). An inventor who ends up 
disseminating technology to the world, either by practicing the invention or by 
transferring technology to others who do, would be able to enforce the patent 
against both copiers and independent infringers. And a practicing entity would 
similarly be able to enforce patents against both copiers and independent 
infringers on a commercialization theory. 
Introducing even such a limited independent invention defense would 
require courts to evaluate disputed claims of copying in some cases. Some 
have worried that much independent invention is really copying in disguise,104 
 
99 Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 13, at 1423. 
100 Id. 
101 E.g., Carl Shapiro, Prior User Rights, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 92, 95 (2006) (arguing in 
favor of prior use rights for nearly simultaneous independent inventors); Samson Vermont, 
Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 475, 479-80 
(2006) (arguing in favor of defense for independent inventors to infringement). 
102 Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105 MICH. 
L. REV. 1525, 1527-32 (2007). 
103 While in an ideal world a court might want to determine whether there was transfer of 
non-patent know-how along with the patent, any legal rule requiring such a transfer would 
lead to sham transactions in which NPEs attach useless “know-how” to a nonexclusive 
patent license in order to obtain more favorable treatment. 
104 See Merges, supra note 56, at 8. 
  
2018] IS PATENT ENFORCEMENT EFFICIENT? 667 
 
though others are skeptical.105 As Sam Vermont has observed, though, courts 
are quite good at resolving factual disputes of this sort.106 Independent 
development will tend to leave a paper trail. And the parties will have an 
incentive to collect and present evidence on the question. While unscrupulous 
parties may try to manufacture evidence, that is true in any sort of case, and 
courts tend to be good at ferreting it out.107 Further, we think courts can 
properly include indirect copying from an idea once it has been publicized by 
the patentee within the concept of copying.108 
We might worry in the opposite direction, that if we require proof either of 
commercialization or of technology transfer to avoid independent invention, 
NPEs will engage in “token use” (offering to make a few customer products) 
or token technology transfer, insisting on making a licensee take know-how 
whether they want it or not. That is indeed a potential problem. Courts will 
have to resolve what is real, good-faith commercialization or technology 
transfer in borderline cases. But we think they will generally be able to 
distinguish good-faith commercialization from token use, just as they do in 
trademark priority cases. 
A requirement that patentees who don’t engage in any form of 
commercialization or technology transfer prove that the defendant copied from 
them should be paired with stricter penalties against those deemed to have 
copied the invention. It would be reasonable to require, not merely permit, 
treble damage awards and attorneys’ fees against those found to have copied. 
Increasing the penalties for those who opt to take technology from a patentee 
without paying, while eliminating the penalty imposed on innovators who do 
not benefit from patentee technology transfer, properly aligns the patent 
system’s incentives with the evidence and the array of theoretical justifications 
for patents. 
Focusing patent enforcement on cases in which the patentee has actually 
contributed something to society would return patent law to its utilitarian roots 
as a promoter of innovation. It would also mean that a large percentage of 
current patent lawsuits, and most (though not all) suits filed by NPEs, would 
disappear. Because those suits impose a pure cost on society without any 
corresponding benefit, eliminating them offers the promise of making patent 
enforcement efficient. 
 
105 Lemley, supra note 12, at 711 (“[S]urveys of hundreds of significant new 
technologies show that almost all of them are invented simultaneously or nearly 
simultaneously by two or more teams working independently of each other.”). 
106 See generally Vermont, supra note 101. 
107 See id. at 502-03 (arguing that risk of fraudulent claims of independent invention 
exists but is unconvincing, and that courts could place higher evidentiary burden on 
independent inventors to provide corroborated evidence of invention in such cases). 
108 Merges, supra note 56, at 29. 
